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Abstract—We consider the problem of hiding wireless com-
munications from an eavesdropper that employs a deep learning
(DL) classifier to detect whether any transmission of interest
is present or not. There exists one transmitter that transmits
to its receiver in the presence of an eavesdropper, while a
cooperative jammer (CJ) transmits carefully crafted adversarial
perturbations over the air to fool the eavesdropper into clas-
sifying the received superposition of signals as noise. The CJ
puts an upper bound on the strength of perturbation signal to
limit its impact on the bit error rate (BER) at the receiver. We
show that this adversarial perturbation causes the eavesdropper
to misclassify the received signals as noise with high probability
while increasing the BER only slightly. On the other hand, the CJ
cannot fool the eavesdropper by simply transmitting Gaussian
noise as in conventional jamming and instead needs to craft
perturbation signals built by adversarial machine learning to
enable covert communications. Our results show that signals with
different modulation types and eventually 5G communications
can be effectively hidden from an eavesdropper even if it is
equipped with a DL classifier to detect transmissions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information privacy is a fundamental problem in wireless
communications due to the open and shared nature of wire-
less medium. A canonical setting consists of a transmitter-
receiver pair and an eavesdropper that aims to infer about
the communications from the transmitter to its receiver. The
eavesdropper may pursue different objectives such as decoding
transmissions or detecting whether there is an ongoing trans-
mission, or not. Information privacy regarding unauthorized
decoding has been extensively studied both from encryption-
based security and information-theoretical studies [1], [2].
In this paper, we consider an eavesdropper that pursues the
second objective, namely detecting an ongoing transmission.
Once a transmission is detected, other attacks such as jamming
can be launched subsequently.
Covert communication has been studied in terms of hid-
ing information in noise where the main goal has been to
reduce the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the eavesdropper
[3], [4]. A fundamental bound has been established on the
total transmit power over a given number of channel uses
while keeping communications covert, known generally as
the square-root law [5]; see also [6] for related work. In
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this paper, we approach the covert communications problem
from an adversarial machine learning (AML) point of view.
AML studies the problem of machine learning (ML) in the
presence of adversaries that may attempt to manipulate test
and training processes of ML algorithms [7]–[9]. While the
origin of applications on AML is in computer vision, there
has been a growing interest in applying AML to wireless
communications, including exploratory (inference), causative
(poisoning), evasion, Trojan and spoofing attacks [10]–[16].
We consider an eavesdropper with a deep learning (DL)
based classifier to identify an ongoing transmission. This
classifier achieves high accuracy in distinguishing received
signals from noise. We introduce a cooperative jammer (CJ)
that has been extensively used in physical layer security
literature [17]–[19]. In this paper, the CJ transmits over the
air at the same time as the transmitter with the purpose of
misleading the eavesdropper’s classifier. This corresponds to
an evasion attack (or adversarial attack) in AML. Evasion
attacks have been used to manipulate spectrum access [20]–
[22], autoencoder communications [23] and modulation classi-
fiers [24]–[26]. In this paper, evasion attack is used as means
of covert communications to prevent an eavesdropper from
distinguishing an ongoing transmission from noise.
We use the CJ as the source of adversarial perturbation to
fool the classifier at an eavesdropper into making classification
errors. While a large perturbation added by the CJ can easily
fool the classifier, it would also increase the interference and
the bit error rate (BER) at the intended receiver to undesirable
levels. Therefore, an upper bound on the perturbation strength
is imposed. A special case of our setting has been considered
in [27], where the transmitter adds perturbations to its own
signals to fool a modulation classifier while aiming to sustain
its own communications performance. In this paper, our focus
is on covert communications assisted by a CJ, whose position
can further boost the impact on the eavesdropper to classify
received signal as noise while reducing the impact on the BER
performance. Note that it is typically more challenging to fool
a classifier into misclassifying a signal as noise (as considered
in this paper) instead of confusing it among signal types
(as considered in [27]). For the performance evaluation, we
start with basic (QPSK and 16QAM) modulated signals, and
then extend to more complicated 5G communication signals,
and show that we can effectively hide these signals from an
eavesdropper that uses a DL classifier to detect transmissions.
Transmitter
Cooperative
Jammer
Receiver
Eavesdropper
Htr
Hte
Hce
Hcr
x
n tr
n te
Fig. 1. System model.
The perturbation of the CJ is selected to minimize the
strength of the perturbation subject to the condition of suc-
cessfully fooling the eavesdropper, and an upper bound on the
perturbation power that can translate to limiting the BER at
the receiver. We show that Gaussian noise is not effective as an
adversarial perturbation and develop an algorithm to optimize
perturbations for the CJ to enable covert communications that
we demonstrate for signals with different modulation types
and 5G communications.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wireless system that consists of a transmitter,
a receiver, a CJ, and an eavesdropper as shown in Fig. 1. The
transmitter sends p complex symbols, x ∈ Cp, by mapping a
binary input sequence m ∈ {0, 1}l. Specifically, x = gs(m),
where gs : {0, 1}l → Cp and s represents the modulation
type of the transmitter. Then the transmitter’s signal received
at node j (either the receiver r or the eavesdropper e) is
rtj = Htjgs(m) + ntj = Htjx+ ntj , j ∈ {r, e}, (1)
where Htj = diag{htj,1, · · · , htj,p} ∈ Cp×p and ntj ∈ Cp
are the channel and complex Gaussian noise from the trans-
mitter to node j, respectively. Upon receiving the signal rtr,
the receiver decodes the message with the BER given by
Pe(m, rtr) =
1
l
l∑
i=1
I{mi 6= mˆi}, (2)
where mˆi is a decoded bit and I{·} is an indicator function.
The eavesdropper tries to detect the existence of wireless
transmission using a pre-trained DL-based classifier, namely
a deep neural network (DNN), f(.; θ) : X → R2, where θ
is the set of DNN parameters and X ⊂ Cp. Input x ∈ X is
assigned label lˆ(x, θ) = argmaxk fk(x, θ) where fk(x, θ) is
the output of classifier f corresponding to the kth class.
To make communications between the transmitter and its
receiver covert, the CJ transmits perturbation signal δ ∈ Cp
to cause misclassification at the eavesdropper by changing the
label of the received signal rte from signal to noise. Thus, if
the transmitter transmits x, the received signal at node j is
r′tj(δ) = Htjx+Hcjδ + ntj , j ∈ {r, e}, (3)
where Hcj = diag{hcj,1, · · ·, hcj,p} ∈ Cp×p is the channel
from the CJ to node j.
Since the perturbation signal from the CJ not only creates
interference at the eavesdropper, but also at the receiver, the
CJ determines its signal δ to cause misclassification at the
eavesdropper using fixed power budget Pmax that also limits
the BER at the receiver. Formally, the CJ first determines δ
by solving the following optimization problem:
argmin
δ
||δ||2
s.t. lˆ(rte, θ) 6= lˆ(r′te(δ), θ)
||δ||22 ≤ Pmax. (4)
The solution δ∗ to (4) results in the BER, Pe(m, r
′
tr(δ
∗)),
at the receiver that can be bounded to a target level by
selecting Pmax accordingly. Since solving (4) is difficult,
different methods have been proposed in computer vision to
approximate the adversarial perturbations like the fast gradient
method (FGM) [7]. The FGM is computationally efficient for
crafting adversarial attacks by linearizing the loss function,
L(θ,x,y), of the DNN classifier in a neighborhood of x
where y is the label vector. This linearized function is used
for optimization. In this paper, we consider a targeted attack,
where the perturbation of the CJ aims to decrease the loss
function of the class noise and cause a specific misclassifi-
cation, from signal to noise, at the eavesdropper even though
there is an actual transmission. We approach the problem from
an AML point of view and aim to fool a target classifier,
which is equivalent to hiding communications in noise from
a wireless communication perspective. While designing the
perturbation, we constrain the BER at the receiver to stay
below certain level while satisfying the power constraint at the
CJ, as stated in the constraints of the optimization problem
(4). We assume that the CJ collaborates with the transmitter
and thus knows the transmitted signal from the transmitter.
III. ADVERSARIAL PERTURBATION FOR THE CJ
In this section, we design the white-box perturbation for
the CJ using targeted FGM to solve (4). For the targeted
attack, the CJ minimizes L(θ, r′te(δ),y
target) with respect
to δ where ytarget is one-hot encoded desired target class.
We fix ytarget as noise class since the CJ always tries to
add perturbation to fool the eavesdropper into misclassifying
a received signal as noise. We use FGM to linearize the
loss function as L(θ, r′te(δ),y
target) ≈ L(θ, rte,ytarget) +
δT∇xL(θ, rte,ytarget) and then minimize it by setting δ =
−α∇xL(θ, rte,ytarget), where α is a scaling factor to con-
strain the adversarial perturbation power to Pmax. After we
obtain δ that causes misclassification at the eavesdropper
and satisfies the power constraint, we check the BER at the
receiver. The perturbation power can further be adjusted to
meet a target BER level. The details of determining the CJ’s
perturbation signal are presented in Algorithm 1.
IV. SIMULATION SETTING
We analyze the success of covertness achieved by CJ’s
perturbation at the eavesdropper and the corresponding effect
Algorithm 1: Generating the perturbation of the CJ
Inputs: input rte, desired accuracy εacc, power constraint
Pmax and L(θ, ·, ·)
Initialize: ε← 0, εmax ←
√
Pmax, εmin ← 0
δnorm =
∇xL(θ,rte,y
target)
(||∇xL(θ,rte,ytarget)||2)
while εmax − εmin > εacc do
εavg ← (εmax + εmin)/2
xadv ← rte − εavgδnorm
if lˆ(xadv) == noise then εmin ← εavg
else εmax ← εavg
end
ε = εmax, δ
jam = −εδnorm
random Gaussian noise transmitted by the CJ. Furthermore,
we change the location of the CJ to investigate the effects
of topology and channel. We assume that the binary source
data is generated independently and uniformly at the receiver.
The classifier at the eavesdropper is a convolutional neural
network (CNN). The input to the CNN is of two dimensions
(2,16) corresponding to 16 in-phase/quadrature (I/Q) data
samples. The CNN consists of a convolutional layer with
kernel size (1, 3), a hidden layer with dropout rate 0.1, ReLu
activation function at convolutional and hidden layers and
softmax activation function at the output layer that provides
the label signal or noise. We apply backpropagation algorithm
with Adam optimizer to train the CNN using cross-entropy
as the loss function. The CNN is implemented in Keras
with TensorFlow backend. We assume that the eavesdropper
already knows the signal type that is used at the transmitter.
Thus, the classifier at the eavesdropper is only trained with
two labels, signal and noise. For each signal type, we train
a separate classifier using different datasets, where 20000
symbols are generated and split into blocks of 16 I/Q symbols.
The channel between the nodes have path-loss effects such
that the channel gain from node i to node j is hij =
(
d0
dij
)γ
,
where dij is the distance from node i to j, d0 is the reference
distance and γ is the path loss exponent. We set d0 = 1 and
γ = 2.8 throughout the simulations. Note that we can further
use methods introduced in [25] to incorporate other channel
effects such as shadowing and small-scale fading.
We use the perturbation-to-noise ratio (PNR) metric from
[24] that captures the relative perturbation power at the CJ
with respect to the noise and measure how the increase in the
PNR affects the accuracy of the classifier at the eavesdropper.
As the PNR increases, the perturbation generated at the CJ is
more likely to be detected by the eavesdropper and increases
the BER at the receiver.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION FOR SIGNALS WITH
DIFFERENT MODULATIONS
A. Covertness of Communications
We aim to hide signals with a fixed modulation scheme,
namely QPSK or 16QAM, used by the transmitter. The first
topology that we consider is dcr = dce = 1. In Fig. 2, we
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Fig. 2. Success of covertness at the eavesdropper when dce = dcr = 1.
−25 −20 −15 −10 −5 0
PNR (dB)
0
20
40
60
80
100
Su
cc
es
s o
f c
ov
er
tn
es
s (
%
)
Proposed jamming
QPSK SNR =3dB
QPSK SNR =5dB
QPSK SNR =7dB
16QAM SNR = 3dB
16QAM SNR = 5dB
16QAM SNR = 7dB
Gaussian noise
QPSK SNR =3dB
QPSK SNR =5dB
QPSK SNR =7dB
16QAM SNR =3dB
16QAM SNR =5dB
16QAM SNR =7dB
Fig. 3. Success of covertness at the eavesdropper when dce = 0.5 and
dcr = 1.5.
show how the perturbation signal generated at the CJ affects
the classifier at the eavesdropper. The x-axis is the PNR
(measured in dB) and the y-axis is the success of covertness
(measured in percentage) that indicates the success of making
wireless communication covert, namely the likelihood that
the eavesdropper classifies signal plus perturbation as noise.
We observe that as the SNR of the signal increases, the CJ
needs more perturbation power to cause misclassification at
the eavesdropper. Furthermore, the 16QAM-modulated signal
is more susceptible to adversarial perturbation than the QPSK-
modulated signal, since it is more difficult to distinguish the
16QAM-modulated signal from the noise for the same SNR.
Also, we observe that the success of covertness suddenly
increases after some PNR value for both modulation types. On
the contrary, the Gaussian noise-based perturbation has neg-
ligible effect on the classifier for all SNR values. We further
observe that Gaussian noise with more power decreases the
success of covertness when the SNR of 16-QAM modulated
signal is 3 dB. The reason is the randomness of the Gaussian
noise, which in fact strengthens the noise-like signal to be
classified as a signal at the eavesdropper.
In Fig. 3, we consider dcr = 1.5 and dce = 0.5 (namely, the
distance between the CJ and the receiver is increased and the
distance between the CJ and the eavesdropper is decreased
compared to Fig. 2). As the SNR of the signal increases,
the CJ requires more power to cause misclassification at the
eavesdropper, as we have also observed in Fig. 2. Due to the
reduced path loss effect between the CJ and the eavesdropper,
−25 −20 −15 −10 −5 0
PNR (dB)
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
BE
R
Pro osed jamming
QPSK SNR =3dB
QPSK SNR =5dB
QPSK SNR =7dB
16QAM SNR = 3dB
16QAM SNR = 5dB
16QAM SNR = 7dB
Gaussian noise
QPSK SNR = 3dB
QPSK SNR = 5dB
QPSK SNR = 7dB
16QAM SNR = 3dB
16QAM SNR = 5dB
16QAM SNR = 7dB
Fig. 4. BER at the receiver when dce = dcr = 1.
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Fig. 5. BER at the receiver when dce = 0.5 and dcr = 1.5.
less power is required to cause misclassification compared
to Fig. 2. This result motivates the use of AML instead of
conventional jamming (e.g., [28]) to attack an eavesdropper.
B. Reliability of Communications
The BER performance at the receiver for different modula-
tion types and SNR values is compared in Fig. 4 when dcr =
dce = 1. We observe that the BER of 16QAM-modulated
signals is more susceptible to the adversarial perturbation
signal than the BER of QPSK-modulated signals. The reason
is that since the 16QAM transmits more bits than the QPSK,
the distances between constellation points are smaller, which
leads to a larger BER for a given SNR. Moreover, as the
SNR increases, the average BER decreases as expected. For
the CJ with proposed adversarial perturbation, we observe
that the BER curve saturates after some PNR value because
the successful perturbation signal can be generated using less
power than the maximum power that the CJ can use. Fig. 4
can be used as a guideline to determine the maximum PNR
to satisfy the BER requirement at the receiver. For example,
to meet the target BER of 0.15 for a QPSK-modulated signal,
the PNR is selected at most -8dB when SNR is 3dB and
the resulting success of covertness is 65%. Furthermore, we
observe that the Gaussian noise-based perturbation results in
lower BER than the adversarial perturbation in the low PNR
regime. However, the BER gap between these two CJ schemes
decreases when the PNR increases, and the adversarial per-
turbation results in a smaller BER in the high PNR region.
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Fig. 6. 5G communications covertness performance at the eavesdropper.
The BER performance at the receiver for different mod-
ulation types and SNR values is compared in Fig. 5 when
dcr = 1.5 and dce = 0.5. We observe that the BER gap
between the Gaussian noise and adversarial perturbation for
the same SNR value decreases due to the increased path loss
effect between the CJ and the receiver. Thus, the CJ can create
a perturbation signal that causes misclassification with higher
success without increasing the BER further if the location of
the CJ is closer to the eavesdropper. This result motivates
the control of CJ positions to fool a target classifier while
protecting the BER performance of the intended receiver.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION FOR 5G
COMMUNICATIONS
As a full-fledged waveform to hide, we consider the 5G
physical layer communications where a 5G User Equipment
(UE) transmits the 5G uplink signal to the base station (gN-
odeB) in the presence of the perturbation from the CJ. MAT-
LAB 5G toolbox is used to generate 5G signals that include
the transport (uplink shared channel, UL-SCH) and physical
channel. The transport block is segmented after the cyclic re-
dundancy check (CRC) addition and low-density parity-check
(LDPC) coding is used as forward error correction. The output
codewords are QPSK modulated as an example. Next, the
generated resource grid is OFDM modulated with Inverse Fast
Fourier Transform and Cyclic Prefix (CP) addition operations
where the subcarrier spacing is 15 kHz. Target code rate
is set to 8201024 and the output I/Q samples are stored after
the signal passes through the channel. Eavesdropper attempts
to distinguish the received signals from noise, whereas the
receiver attempts to decode the received signals by removing
the CP and performing FFT, channel equalization, QPSK
demodulation, LDPC and CRC decoding operations.
A. Covertness of Communications
The success of covertness for 5G communications is con-
sidered in Fig. 6. As we have seen in the previous figures
for QPSK-modulated signals and 16QAM-modulated signals,
the proposed jamming outperforms the Gaussian noise signif-
icantly in high PNR region for 5G communication signals.
Also, we observe that more power is needed for CJ to fool
the classifier at the eavesdropper when the distance between
the CJ and the eavesdropper increases.
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Fig. 7. 5G communications BER performance at the receiver.
B. Reliability of Communications
The BER for 5G communications is shown in Fig. 7. When
dce = dcr = 1 and SNR is 5 dB, the Gaussian noise-based
perturbation has higher BER performance compared to the
proposed perturbation and a similar result is also observed
for other SNR values. Note that the adversarial perturbation
by the CJ not only increases the success of covertness, but
also has less effect on the BER performance of the receiver
compared to the Gaussian noise-based perturbation for 5G
communication signals. We further observe that the Gaussian
noise-based perturbation results in higher BER than the pro-
posed adversarial perturbation when dce = 0.5, dcr = 1.5.
VII. CONCLUSION
We considered a wireless communication system in which a
CJ designs its perturbation signal to fool a DL-based classifier
at the eavesdropper into classifying the ongoing transmissions
as noise. Following the AML approach, the CJ was designed
to generate the perturbation signal with the FGM method
subject to channel effects. For both basic modulated signals
and sophisticated 5G signals, we showed that the CJ can
generate a perturbation signal that causes misclassification at
the eavesdropper (from signal to noise) with high success,
while the BER at the receiver is only slightly affected. On
the other hand, CJ with Gaussian noise is not successful in
fooling the classifier. These results demonstrate the feasibility
of covert communications when cast as an evasion attack
against a DL-based classifier employed by an eavesdropper.
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